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ERISA-ESCAPE CLAUSES

IN EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS ARE

UNENFORCEABLE UNDER

ERISA

Northeast Department ILGWU Health and Welfare Fund v. Teamsters Local
Union No. 229 Welfare Fund (1985)
In 1974, Congress enacted the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)' to regulate the rapidly growing number of employee benefit plans. 2 ERISA was designed to ensure that employee
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1982). The primary purpose of ERISA was to
protect employees' individual pension rights by establishing comprehensive federal standards to govern private employee benefit and pension plans. H.R. REP.
No. 533, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1, reprintedin 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
4639. These federal standards provide for: (1) the disclosure and reporting of
financial and other information with respect to employee benefit plans; (2) the
standard of care owed by fiduciaries of employee benefit plans; (3) the appropriate remedies and right of access to federal courts for participants, beneficiaries,
and fiduciaries and (4) the mandatory vesting of accrued employee benefits after
a significant period of service. ERISA § 2, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1982).
2. See ERISA § 2(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1982) ("Congress finds that the
growth in size, scope, and numbers of employee benefit plans ... has been rapid
and substantial"). From 1940 to 1974 the private pension system experienced
an extraordinary rate of growth: from 4.1 to 35.0 million employees covered
and from 2.4 to 150.0 billion dollars in plan assets. The Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974: Policies and Problems, 26 SYRACUSE L. REV. 539, 542 (1975).
This expansion placed the private pension system in a position to influence the
level of savings, the operation of capital markets, and the financial security of
millions of consumers. H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in
1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4639, 4640. Congress enacted ERISA to
assure equitable and fair administration of all pension plans. Id. at 3, reprinted in
1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4641.
The enactment of ERISA followed years of effort at the federal level to regulate employee benefit plans. Id., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
at 4641. Various aspects of employee pension plans already had been affected
to some degree by most of the major labor legislation of the twentieth century,
including the National Labor Relations Act (1935), the Labor Management Relations Act (1947), and the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
(1959). Id., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4641. However,
not until the passage of the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act (WPPDA)
in 1958 was legislation specifically enacted to regulate pension and welfare
funds. Id., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4641 (citing 29
U.S.C. § 301-09 (repealed 1974)).
Prior to the WPPDA, employee pension and welfare benefit plans generally
had been regulated at the state level. Lanam, Public Regulation of Self-Insured and
Uninsured Employee Benefit Plans-Who Is to Be Protected? A State Regulator's Perspective, 19 FORUM 309, 310 (1983). The WPPDA imposed disclosure and reporting requirements upon plan administrators but reserved to the states the
detailed regulations relating to the plans. Id. at 311. It was expected that the
information disseminated by plan administrators would enable participants to
police their plans. H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 4, reprinted in 1974
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4639, 4642. However, it became evident that the
WPPDA was inadequate to protect workers' rights and benefits because the
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benefit plan participants would not be deprived of their anticipated benefits. 3 Toward that end, section 502 of ERISA grants participants, bene4
ficiaries and fiduciaries the right to bring civil actions in federal court.
The circuits presently disagree on whether parties not expressly
granted this right, such as benefit plans, may nevertheless bring an action under section 502 of ERISA. 5 Addressing this jurisdictional issue
WPPDA contained only limited disclosure requirements and completely lacked
any substantive fiduciary standards. Id., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 4642. ERISA was enacted in response to the perceived failure of the
WPPDA to regulate the private pension system. Lanam, supra, at 312.
3. ERISA § 2(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) 1982. ERISA's declaration of policy
states:
that despite the enormous growth in [employee benefit] plans many
employees with long years of employment are losing anticipated retirement benefits owing to the lack of vesting provisions in such plans; that
owing to the inadequacy of current minimum standards, the soundness
and stability of plans with respect to adequate funds to pay promised
benefits may be endangered; that owing to the termination of plans
before requisite funds have been accumulated, employees and their
beneficiaries have been deprived of anticipated benefits; and that it is
therefore desirable in the interests of employees and their beneficiaries,
...that minimum standards be provided assuring the equitable character of such plans and their financial soundness.
Id.; see also 120 CONG. REC. 3977 (1974), reprinted in 2 SUBCOMM. ON LABOR OF
THE SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., Legislative History of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, at 3293 (1976)
(primary purpose of bill is protection of individual pension rights).
4. ERISA § 502, 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (1982). Section 502(a) of ERISA provides in pertinent part:
(a) A civil action may be brought(1) by a participant or beneficiary(B) to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his
plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his
rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan;
(2) by the Secretary, or by a participant, beneficiary or fiduciary
for appropriate relief under section 1109 of this title;
(3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act
or practice which violates any provision of this subchapter or the terms
of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to
redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this subchapter or the terms of the plan;
Id. Section 502(e)(1) confers federal jurisdiction over the civil actions authorized in § 502(a) by providing:
Except for actions under section (a)(1)(B) of this section, the district
courts of the United States shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions under this subchapter brought by the Secretary or by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary. State courts of competent jurisdiction
and district courts of the United States shall have concurrent jurisdiction of actions under subsection (a)(1)(B) of this section.
ERISA § 502(e)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1) (1982).
5. Compare Fentron Indus. v. National Shopmen Pension Fund, 674 F.2d
1300 (9th Cir. 1982) (employer has standing to sue under ERISA notwithstanding the omission of "employers" from § 502 of ERISA) and International Ass'n
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in Northeast Department ILGWU Health and Welfare Fund v. Teamsters Local
Union No. 229 Welfare Fund,6 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit decided that, lacking a specific grant, federal jurisdiction
over an action brought by a benefit plan cannot be predicated on section
502 of ERISA. 7 The court, however, found general federal question jurisdiction 8 over the action and proceeded to address the merits of the
case, which presented an issue of first impression under the federal common law of benefit plans covered by ERISA. 9 In deciding which of two
employee benefit plans was obligated to pay the medical bills of a woman covered by both plans, l0 the Third Circuit was required to rule on
the enforceability of "other insurance" provisions that purported to allocate coverage between the overlapping plans. I The court concluded
of Bridge, Structural, and Ornamental Iron Workers Local No. Ill v. Douglas,
646 F.2d 1211 (7th Cir.) (union has standing to sue under § 502(a)(1)(B) even
though unions are not enumerated among persons or entities that may bring
suit), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 866 (1981) with New Jersey State AFL-CIO v. New
Jersey, 747 F.2d 891 (3d Cir. 1984) (labor unions may not sue under
§ 502(a)(1)(B) of ERISA because they are not one of parties authorized to sue
under that section) and Tuvia Convalescent Center v. National Union of Hospital & Health Care Employees, 717 F.2d 726 (2d Cir. 1983) (employer has no
standing to sue under § 502 because not specifically listed) and Pressroom Unions-Printers League Income Sec. Fund v. Continental Assurance Co., 700 F.2d
889 (2d Cir.) (benefit fund cannot sue under ERISA because Congress did not
intend entities other than those expressly listed in § 502 to have a cause of action under ERISA), cert. dismissed, 463 U.S. 1233, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 845 (1983).
For a further discussion of the split among the circuits concerning the interpretation of § 502, see infra notes 34-38 & 89-92 and accompanying text.
6. 764 F.2d 147 (3d Cir. 1985). The case was heard by Judges Sloviter and
Becker of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, and Judge Fullam of the Eastern
District Court of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. Id. at 149. Judge Becker
delivered the opinion of the court, and Judges Sloviter and Fullam filed concurring opinions. Id. at 149, 164 (Sloviter, J., concurring); id. at 166 (Fullam, J.,
concurring).
7. 764 F.2d at 154.
8. Id. at 151. Although the court was unanimous in concluding that federal
jurisdiction existed over the action, each judge based his conclusion on a different theory. Id. Judges Sloviter and Becker agreed that the district court had
jurisdiction over the action pursuant to the general federal question statute,
although they disagreed as to the rationale for that conclusion. Id. at 154-59; id.
at 164-66 (Sloviter, J., concurring). The general federal question statute provides: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331(a) (1982). For a discussion ofJudge Becker's view, see infra notes 45-51
and accompanying text. For a discussion ofJudge Sloviter's view see infra notes
52-64 and accompanying text. For a discussion ofJudge Fullam's view see infra
notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
9. 764 F.2d at 159. For a discussion of why federal common law governed
the outcome of the dispute, see infra notes 46-51 & 97 and accompanying text.
10. For a further discussion of the facts that gave rise to the dispute, see
infra notes 13-21 and accompanying text.
11. 764 F.2d at 160-64. An "other insurance" clause is language within an
insurance policy that attempts to limit or eliminate the liability of the insurer if
the insured is covered by another insurance policy or plan. 16 COUCH ON INSUR-
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that one such provision, an escape clause, is unenforceable as a matter
12
of law under ERISA.
The issues in ILGWU arose from an action seeking a declaratory
judgment of the rights and obligations of two employee benefit plans
regarding the medical expenses of Ruth Fazio, an employee in the garment industry.1 3 Mrs. Fazio was eligible for medical benefits as a participant in the garment industry's local employee benefit plan, the
Northeast Department International Ladies Garment Workers' Union
Health and Welfare Fund (ILGWU Fund). 14 She was also eligible for
medical benefits as a beneficiary of her husband's employee benefit plan,
ANCE 2D § 62:41 at 475 (rev'd ed. 1983). In the event of duplicate or overlapping insurance, the "other insurance" clause purports to determine which plan
is primarily liable for the insured's loss. 8A C. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND

§ 4906 at 341 (1981). These provisions generally fall into three categories: pro rata, excess, and escape clauses. 764 F.2d at 160. Pro rata clauses
require both insurers to allocate the loss, generally in proportion to each insurer's share of the total coverage provided by both policies. C. APPLEMAN,
supra, at § 4906. An excess clause in a policy generally provides that if another
valid and collectible insurance policy covers the occurrence in question, then
that policy must provide primary coverage to the extent of its policy limits and
the policy containing the excess clause must pay only for losses above the policy
limits of the primary policy. Id. at § 4909. A basic escape clause in a policy
attempts to avoid all liability by providing that the policy shall not provide any
coverage if there is other valid and collectible insurance. Id. at § 4910. For a
further discussion of such provisions, and the relevant text of the "other insurance" provisions in the employee benefit plans at issue in this dispute, see infra
notes 22-26 and accompanying text.
12. 764 F.2d at 162-64. In explaining its reasoning, the court stated that
the trustees of an ERISA plan must conform with ERISA's standard of fiduciary
conduct. Id. at 162 (citing ERISA § 404, 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (1982)). Under a
prior Third Circuit ruling, a decision by the trustees of an ERISA plan to deny
benefits to plan participants meets the fiduciary requirements of ERISA provided the decision is not arbitrary and capricious. 764 F.2d at 162 (citing Struble v. New Jersey Brewery Employees' Welfare Trust Fund, 732 F.2d 325, 33334 (3d Cir. 1984)). The ILGWU court decided that a decision to include an escape clause in an ERISA plan was arbitrary and capricious in violation of ERISA's standard of fiduciary conduct because the clause attempted to defer
liability to another plan without regard to the level of benefits provided by the
other plan. 764 F.2d at 163. The court, therefore, concluded that escape
clauses are unenforceable as a matter of law under ERISA. Id. For a further
discussion of the court's reasoning regarding the unenforceability of escape
clauses in ERISA plans, see infra notes 81-85 and accompanying text. For a further discussion of ERISA's standard of fiduciary conduct and the text of § 404 of
ERISA, see infra notes 75-80 and accompanying text.
13. 764 F.2d at 150.
14. Id. ERISA defines a participant as
any employee or former employee of an employer, or any member or
former member of an employee organization, who is or may become
eligible to receive a benefit of any type from an employee benefit plan
which covers employees of such employer or members of such organization, or whose beneficiaries may be eligible to receive any such
benefit.
ERISA § 3(7), 29 U.S.C. 1002(7) (1982).
PRACTICE
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the Teamsters Local Union No. 229 Welfare Fund (Teamsters Fund).' 5
Both the ILGWU Fund and the Teamsters Fund were employee benefit
plans covered by ERISA.1 6 Mrs. Fazio incurred medical expenses which
she subsequently attempted to recover, but both plans denied payment, 17 each plan contending that the other was obligated to pay for her

expenses. 18
Unable to recover any of her medical expenses, Mrs. Fazio filed suit
in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania naming both funds as defendants. 19 At the suggestion of the
district court, the ILGWU Fund paid Mrs. Fazio's claim and contemporaneously filed a complaint against the Teamsters Fund seeking a declaration of the rights and obligations of the two funds regarding Mrs.
Fazio's claim and the claims of others similarly situated. 20 The ILGWU
Fund added its trustee, Sol Hoffman, as a party plaintiff, and predicated
21
federal jurisdiction over the new suit on two provisions of ERISA.
15. 764 F.2d at 150. ERISA defines a beneficiary as "a person designated
by a participant, or by the terms of an employee benefit plan, who is or may
become entitled to a benefit thereunder." ERISA § 3(8), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(8)
(1982). Mrs. Fazio was a beneficiary under the terms of the Teamsters Fund
because the plan provided medical coverage for the spouse and children of covered employees. 764 F.2d at 150.
16. 764 F.2d at 150. ERISA defines the term "employee benefit plan" to
include both welfare benefit plans and pension benefit plans. ERISA § 3(3), 29
U.S.C. § 1002(3) (1982). A welfare benefit plan includes any program that provides benefits for contingencies such as illness, accident, disability, death or unemployment. ERISA § 3(1)(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)(a) (1982). A pension
benefit plan provides income deferral or retirement income. ERISA § 3(2), 29
U.S.C. § 1002(2) (1982).
17. 764 F.2d at 150. Mrs. Fazio first submitted her bills to the ILGWU
Fund. Id. The ILGWU Fund advised her that she was not eligible for benefits
under her plan because she was covered by the Teamster's plan. Id. Mr. Fazio
thereupon submitted his wife's medical bills to the Teamsters Fund. Id. The
Teamsters Fund subsequently advised Mrs. Fazio that it would not pay her bills
because she was covered by the ILGWU plan. Id.
18. Id. Each plan contained "other insurance" provisions that purported to
defer coverage of a participant or beneficiary if the participant or beneficiary was
covered by another insurance policy or plan. Id. For a discussion of "other insurance" provisions, see supra note 11 and accompanying text. For the text and
a discussion of the pertinent provisions of the "other insurance" clauses in the
ILGWU's Fund's and Teamsters Fund's policies, see infra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
19. 764 F.2d at 150.
20. Id. The district court observed that Mrs. Fazio was entitled to reimbursement of her medical expenses from one of the funds. Id. Finding it unfair
for Mrs. Fazio to wait for payment and incur counsel fees while the court decided which fund was liable for her bills, the district court suggested, and the
defendants agreed, that: (1) the ILGWU Fund would pay Mrs. Fazio's claim;
(2) Mrs. Fazio's action would then be dismissed and (3) the ILGWU Fund would
file, contemporaneously with the dismissal, a complaint in federal court against
the Teamsters Fund to settle the dispute. Id.
21. Id. Sol Hoffman was the chairman of the ILGWU Fund's trustees. Id.
He was added as a plaintiff apparently in an attempt to provide an additional
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In the district court, 2 2 the ILGWU Fund contended that an escape
clause 23 in its plan relieved the ILGWU Fund of all liability because Mrs.
Fazio was covered as a beneficiary of the Teamsters Fund. 2 4 The Teamsters Fund contended that an excess clause 25 in its plan rendered the
basis for jurisdiction under ERISA. Id. The district court did not set forth its
basis for finding federal subject matter jurisdiction over the new suit. See Northeast Dept. ILGWU Health & Welfare Fund v. Teamsters Local Union No. 229
Welfare Fund, 584 F. Supp. 68 (M.D. Pa. 1983). The Third Circuit noted, however, that jurisdiction in the district court was predicated upon ERISA
§ 502(a)(1)(B) (covering suits by participants or beneficiaries to recover benefits) and § 502(a)(3) (covering equitable actions by participants, beneficiaries, or
fiduciaries). 764 F.2d at 150. For the relevant provisions and a further discussion of § 502, see supra note 4.
22. 584 F. Supp. at 69. The parties stipulated to the facts before the district
court and made cross-motions for summary judgment. Id.
23. 764 F.2d at 150. The ILGWU Fund's escape clause was included in a
section entitled "Exception to Eligibility" and provided:
Exception to Eligibility-You are not eligible for hospital, medical-surgical, or Major Medical benefits under this plan if there exists at your
spouse's place of employment a group plan which provides for family
coverage of these types of benefits so long as 50% or more of the cost
of such family coverage is paid for by other than you or a member of
your family.
Id. at 151 (quoting Appellant's Appendix at 54a).
The ILGWU plan also contained a "Coordination of Benefits" clause that
specified when the plan was to be the primary insurer of a participant or beneficiary and when the plan was to be a secondary or excess insurer. Id. The
ILGWU Fund "Coordination of Benefits" clause did not address the situation
where, as here, a participant was also a potential beneficiary of a spouse's plan.
Id. at 150-51.
24. Id. at 150.
25. Id. The Teamsters plan contained a "Coordination of Benefits" section
in the form of an excess clause that provided:
Our Group Insurance Plan contains a non-profit provision coordinating it with other plans under which an individual is covered so that
the total benefits available will not exceed 100% of the allowable
expenses.
An "allowable expense" is any necessary, reasonable and customary expense covered, at least in part, by one of the plans.
"Plans" means these types of medical and dental care benefits:
(a) coverage (other than Medicare) under a governmental program or
provided or required by statute, including no fault coverage to the extent required in policies or contracts by a motor vehicle insurance statute or similar legislation, and (b) group insurance or other coverage for
a group of individuals, including student coverage obtained through an
educational institution above the high school level.
When a claim is made the primary plan pays it benefits without regard
to any other plans. The secondary plans adjust their benefits so that
the total benefits available will not exceed the allowable expenses. No
plan pays more than it would without the coordination provision. A
plan without a coordinating provision is always the primary plan. If all
plans have such a provision: (1) the plan covering the patient directly,
rather than as an employee's dependent, is primary and the other is
secondary, (2) if a child is covered under both parents' plans, the father's is primary, (3) if neither (1) nor (2) applies, the plan covering the
patient longest is primary.
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Teamsters Fund liable only for the portion of Mrs. Fazio's medical expenses that exceeded the policy limits of the ILGWU plan. 26 The district court found the escape clause of the ILGWU plan controlling,
thereby rendering the Teamsters Fund liable for all of Mrs. Fazio's med28
ical bills. 27 The Teamsters Fund appealed.
In reviewing the district court's decision, the Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit initially addressed the jurisdictional issues. 29 The
When ours is the secondary plan and its payment is reduced to consider
the primary plan's benefits, a record is kept of the reduction. This
amount will be used to increase our Group Insurance Plan's payments
on the patient's later claims in the same calendar year-to the extent
that there are allowable expenses that would not otherwise be fully paid
by our Group Insurance Plan and the others.
Id. at 160 n.9 (quoting Appellant's Appendix at 88a).
26. Id. at 150. Moreover, the Teamsters Fund claimed that if the ILGWU
Fund's escape provision operated to relieve the ILGWU Fund of liability, the
ILGWU Fund trustees were acting in an arbitrary and capricious manner in violation of their fiduciary duties under ERISA. Id. The basis of this claim was that
the ILGWU Fund's escape clause discriminated among participants on the basis
of sex and marital status. Id. In addressing this claim, the district court determined that the escape provision in the ILGWU plan did not discriminate on the
basis of sex or marital status. 584 F. Supp. at 73. The district court noted that
where trustees have adopted a provision in a plan "because they feared that the
Fund might become financially impaired, [t]hey did not act in an arbitrary and
capricious fashion but rather within their discretion as fiduciaries." Id. at 72
(citing International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers
Local No. 111 v. Douglas, 646 F.2d 1211, 1215 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
866 (1981)). The district court, therefore, concluded that since the exclusion
applied whether the participant was male or female and since married persons
still received coverage, albeit from another source, the escape clause did not
discriminate on the basis of sex or marital status. Id. at 73.
27. 584 F. Supp. at 72. The district court reasoned that the language of the
ILGWU Fund's escape clause excluded coverage of employees if alternative coverage existed, whereas the language of the Teamsters plan provided that it would
be an excess insurer only if a beneficiary was covered by another plan. Id. The
district court reasoned that since the Teamsters Fund existed, the ILGWU
Fund's escape clause relieved the ILGWU Fund of liability. Id. Because the
ILGWU Fund was not liable, the court found that there was no alternative coverage to the Teamsters Fund and, therefore, that the excess clause in the Teamsters plan had no effect. Id. Consequently, the district court concluded that the
Teamsters Fund was liable for all of Mrs. Fazio's medical expenses. Id. at 73.
Underlying the district court's reasoning was its recognition of the fact that
members of the ILGWU generally have lower salaries than members of the
Teamsters Union. Id. at 71 n.6. Consequently, the district court stated that the
ILGWU Fund had more limited financial resources from which to draw in distributing benefits. Id.
The Third Circuit pointed out the negative public policy implications of the
district court's decision by observing "that even a qualified endorsement of escape clauses might encourage benefit plans with excess clauses to replace such
clauses with those of the escape variety in order to 'fight fire with fire.' " 764
F.2d at 164 n.17.
28. 764 F.2d at 151.
29. Id. Both funds contended that there was federal jurisdiction over the
suit. Id. The court of appeals expressed concern over this issue at oral arguments and requested supplemental briefs from both funds on this issue. Id.
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court noted that section 502(a)(1)(B) of ERISA expressly empowers participants and beneficiaries to bring suit to recover benefits, enforce
rights, and clarify rights to future benefits under the terms of an ERISA
plan. 30 Arguing that this section provided jurisdiction over the action,
both funds contended that the ILGWU Fund should be viewed as a representative of all of its participants and beneficiaries and, therefore, the
suit should be viewed as one brought by a participant in or beneficiary of
an ERISA plan. 3 ' In the alternative, the parties contended that federal
jurisdiction was authorized under section 502(a)(3) which provides fiduciaries with a federal cause of action to enforce the terms of an ERISA
plan. 32 The parties argued that the suit could be characterized as one
brought by the ILGWU Fund trustee, Sol Hoffman, who was a fiduciary
33
under ERISA.
Judges Sloviter and Becker concluded that section 502(a)(1)(B) of
ERISA, which grants federal jurisdiction over actions brought by participants and beneficiaries, did not extend to an action brought by an employee benefit plan. 3 4 They recognized that the Seventh 35 and Ninth
Circuits 3 6 had interpreted section 502(a)(1)(B) more liberally, by al-

lowing a labor union and an employer to bring federal actions under
that section of ERISA, notwithstanding the fact that they were not specifically enumerated among the parties entitled to bring suit.3 7 Never30. Id. at 151-52. For the relevant text of § 502 of ERISA, see supra note 4.
If Mrs. Fazio had remained a party, the district court unquestionably would have
had jurisdiction pursuant to § 502(a)(1)(B). 764 F.2d at 152. However, in her
absence, none of the plaintiffs was a participant or beneficiary under the terms of
either benefit plan. Id. For the definitions of a participant and beneficiary under
ERISA, see supra notes 14-15.
31. 764 F.2d at 152. Thus, the parties concluded that jurisdiction was authorized by § 502(a)(1)(B) of ERISA, despite the fact that the parties were not
actually participants or beneficiaries as defined by ERISA. Id.
32. Id. at 153. For the text of § 502(a)(3) of ERISA, see supra note 4.
33. 764 F.2d at 153. ERISA provides that "a person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan to the extent .

.

. he exercises any discretionary authority or

discretionary control respecting management of such plan or... disposition of
its assets ..
" ERISA § 3(21)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (1982).
34. 764 F.2d at 151. Judge Fullam disagreed with Judges Sloviter and
Becker on this issue. Id. at 166-67 (Fullam, J., concurring). For a discussion of
Judge Fullam's reasoning and conclusion on the jurisdictional issue, see infra
notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
35. International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers
Local No. 111 v. Douglas, 646 F.2d 1211 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 866
(1981). For a discussion of Iron Workers, see infra notes 37 & 89.
36. Fentron Indus. v. National Shopmen Pension Fund, 674 F.2d 1300 (9th
Cir. 1982). For a discussion of Fentron, see infra note 37.
37. 764 F.2d at 152 (citing International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural and
Ornamental Iron Workers Local No. 111 v. Douglas, 646 F.2d 1211 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 866 (1981); Fentron Indus. v. National Shopmen Pension
Fund, 674 F.2d 1300 (9th Cir. 1982)). In Iron Workers, the trustees of a multiunion trust fund sought to amend the plan so as to limit certain employees'
eligibility for benefits. 646 F.2d at 1213. A labor union, whose members were
eligible for benefits under the plan, opposed the amendment. Id. The Seventh
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theless, Judges Sloviter and Becker stated that they were bound by the
Third Circuit's prior strict and literal interpretation of section
38
502(a)(1)(B) in New Jersey State AFL-CIO v. New Jersey.
Circuit held that the labor union was entitled to bring an action to clarify its
members' rights to future benefits under § 502(a)(1)(B). Id. at 1214. The court
reasoned that since the labor union members' "right... to future benefits would
be affected by the amendment," there was jurisdiction. Id. (citing ERISA
§ 502(a)(l)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (1982)). In ILGWU, the Third Circuit
criticized this reasoning by noting that the Seventh Circuit had made no attempt
to reconcile its holding with the fact that the express words of § 502 did not
include unions among the list of parties authorized to bring suit. 764 F.2d at
152.
In Fentron, the Ninth Circuit held that an employer had standing to sue a
pension plan on behalf of its employees, notwithstanding the fact that employers
are not included among the list of parties entitled to sue under § 502. 674 F.2d
at 1304-05. The Fentron court stated that a plaintiff has standing to sue for violation of a federal statute if the plaintiff: (1) has suffered an injury in fact; (2) falls
arguably within the zone of interests protected by the statute and (3) can show
that the statute itself does not preclude the suit. Id. at 1304. After determining
that the plaintiff had suffered an injury in fact and was within the zone of interests that Congress intended to protect when it enacted ERISA, the court focused
on whether ERISA itself precluded the suit. Id. at 1304-05. The court determined that the employer had standing to sue under § 502 because the legislative
history did not suggest that the jurisdictional grant of ERISA was exclusive or
that Congress intentionally omitted employers from the list of parties entitled to
bring suit. Id. at 1305.
38. 764 F.2d at 152-53 (citing New Jersey State AFL-CIO v. New Jersey,
747 F.2d 891 (3d Cir. 1984)). In AFL-CIO, a labor union sued the State of New
Jersey seeking a declaratory judgment that four New Jersey statutes enacted in
1983 were invalid because they were preempted by the previously enacted provisions of ERISA. 747 F.2d at 892. The Third Circuit held that the plaintiff labor
union was not a participant or beneficiary as defined in ERISA and, therefore,
dismissed the case for lack of federal jurisdiction. Id. at 893. Supporting its
holding, the Third Circuit stated that
only participants and beneficiaries may bring suit (in either state or federal court) to clarify rights to future benefits under the terms of the
plan. The statute defines "participants" as employees or former employees who are, or may be, eligible to receive benefits ... and "beneficiaries" as people designated by a participant who may become eligible
to receive benefits ....
It is clear from the statute that labor unions are
neither participants nor beneficiaries, and consequently plaintiff does
not fall within this provision.
Id. at 892 (citations omitted).
Judges Sloviter and Becker stated that the court's holding in AFL-CIO did
not directly control the outcome of the instant case because the plaintiff in
ILGWU was a benefit fund and not a labor union. 764 F.2d at 153. Nevertheless, both judges interpreted AFL-CIO as implicitly adopting the view that the
express jurisdictional grant of ERISA should be read narrowly and literally. Id.
They, therefore, concluded that neither a benefit fund nor a trustee of that fund
could be considered a participant or a beneficiary under § 502(a)(l)(B) of ERISA. Id. Judges Sloviter and Becker noted that the Second Circuit had similarly
concluded that an employee benefit fund did not have standing to sue under
§ 502. Id. (citing Pressroom Unions-Printers League Income Sec. Fund v. Continental Assurance Co., 700 F.2d 889 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 463 U.S. 1233, cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 845 (1983)). For a further discussion of Pressroom, see infra note
90 and accompanying text.
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After concluding that the ILGWU Fund could not bring a federal
suit as a participant or beneficiary under ERISA, Judges Sloviter and
Becker addressed the parties' alternative argument that jurisdiction was
authorized under section 502(a)(3) of ERISA, which empowers fiducia-

ries to bring suit to enforce the terms of a plan. 39 Bothjudges reasoned
that the clear intent of the statute was to provide jurisdiction only when
there was a fiduciary relationship between the fiduciary bringing suit and
the fund being sued. 40 Since the ILGWU Fund's trustee Hoffman owed

no fiduciary duty to the Teamsters plan, 4 ' and since Hoffman was not
suing to enforce the terms of the ILGWU Fund, 42 Judges Sloviter and
Becker concluded that jurisdiction could not be based on Hoffman's sta-

tus as a fiduciary. 4 3 Accordingly, they stated that none of the express
jurisdictional provisions of ERISA authorized federal jurisdiction over a
suit brought by a pension fund and its trustee against another pension
Judges Sloviter and Becker also stated that the AFL-CIO holding was not
inconsistent with the Third Circuit's prior decision that an employer who was
also a fiduciary under ERISA could sue pursuant to § 502(a)(3). 764 F.2d at 153
n.3 (citing United States Steel Corp. v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n,
669 F.2d 124 (3d Cir. 1982)). The court explained that in United States Steel it
had not literally construed § 502(a)(1)(B) to include employers. 764 F.2d at
153. Rather, the court stated, it had simply held in United States Steel that a fiduciary had standing to sue under § 502(a)(3), notwithstanding that the fiduciary
was also an employer. See 669 F.2d at 128.
39. 764 F.2d at 153. For the pertinent provisions of § 502(a)(3) of ERISA,
see supra note 4.
40. Id. In interpreting the jurisdictional grant, the court referred to the
statutory definition of "fiduciary," which provides that one's status as a fiduciary
is dependent upon one's relationship to a particular plan. 764 F.2d at 154 (citing ERISA § 3(21)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (1982)). For the statutory definition of a fiduciary, see supra note 33. Relying on this definition, the court
concluded that § 502(a)(3) of ERISA grants jurisdiction over equitable actions
by fiduciaries only when the fiduciaries are suing the plan to which they owe a
fiduciary duty. Id.
41. 764 F.2d at 154. The parties argued that the action could be viewed as
a suit by Hoffman, a fiduciary of the ILGWU Fund, to enforce the terms of the
Teamsters Fund, thereby bringing the suit within the jurisdictional grant of
§ 502(a)(3) of ERISA. Id.
42. Id. The parties also argued that the suit could be viewed as one
brought by ILGWU trustee Hoffman to enforce the terms of the ILGWU Fund
against the Teamsters Fund. Id. The court rejected this argument, reasoning
that the only persons who had the power and the duty to enforce the ILGWU

plan were the ILGWU Fund trustees themselves. Id.
43. Id. The court stated that "U]urisdiction cannot be predicated on the

mere coincidence that Hoffman is a fiduciary of a benefit plan unrelated to the
one he seeks to enforce." Id. (footnote omitted). Although the parties had not
raised the issue, the court noted that § 502(a)(3) of ERISA also authorizes fiduciaries to sue to enforce the provisions of ERISA. Id. at 154 n.5. The court
observed that jurisdiction could not be found under this section because it also
required the existence of a fiduciary duty between the fiduciary bringing suit and
the fund being sued. Id. For the pertinent portions of § 502(a)(3) of ERISA, see
supra note 4.
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44

fund.
After failing to find federal jurisdiction under ERISA, Judges
Sloviter and Becker presented different theories supporting their conclusion that the federal court nevertheless had jurisdiction over the
case. 4 5 Judge Becker stated that if the ILGWU Fund's claim was controlled by federal common law, jurisdiction could be found pursuant to
the general federal question statute, which provides federal jurisdiction
over "all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of
the United States."'4 6 He next considered whether there existed a fed44. 764 F.2d at 154.
45. Id. at 151. The court unanimously concluded that the district court had

properly exercised jurisdiction; however, each judge based that conclusion on a
different theory. Id. Judges Sloviter and Becker agreed that jurisdiction could
not be founded upon the express grant of ERISA. Id. at 151-54; id. at 164
(Sloviter, J., concurring). They also agreed that jurisdiction over the suit was
authorized under the federal question statute, but upon different theories. Id. at
154-59; id. at 165-66 (Sloviter, J., concurring) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a)
(1982)). Judge Fullam maintained that § 502 of ERISA provided jurisdiction.
Id. at 166 (Fullam, J., concurring). For a discussion of Judge Becker's view of
how the federal question statute provided jurisdiction, see infra notes 45-51 and
accompanying text. For a discussion ofJudge Sloviter's view of how the federal
question statute provided jurisdiction, see infra notes 52-64 and accompanying
text. For a discussion ofJudge Fullam's view that § 502 of ERISA provided jurisdiction, see infra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
46. 764 F.2d at 154 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982)). Judge Becker
noted that the Supreme Court in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee conclusively established that the federal question statute provided jurisdiction over "claims
founded upon federal common law as well as those of a statutory origin." 764
F.2d at 154 (citing Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 100 (1972)).
In Illinois, the state alleged that Milwaukee was causing a public nuisance by
dumping raw sewage into Lake Michigan. 406 U.S. at 93. In examining the
federal question statute as a possible basis for jurisdiction, the Supreme Court
stated: "We see no reason not to give 'laws' its natural meaning ... and therefore conclude that [federal question] jurisdiction will support claims founded
upon federal common law as well as those of a statutory origin." Id. at 100. The
Court then noted that Congress had legislated extensively in the area of interstate water pollution, most specifically through the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act. Id. at 101. Even though jurisdiction over the suit was not expressly
authorized by the Act, the Supreme Court determined that there existed a federal common law of nuisance, separate from and co-existing with the statutory
law, which governed the dispute. Id. at 106-07. The Supreme Court decided
that the state's claim arose under this body of federal common law and, therefore, held that the federal question statute provided jurisdiction even in the absence of an express jurisdictional grant in the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act. Id. at 107-08.

Judge Becker stated that under the rationale of Illinois, federal jurisdiction
existed if the ILGWU Fund's claim arose under federal common law, even in the
absence of an express jurisdictional grant in ERISA. 764 F.2d at 155 (citing
Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Local Unions of the Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Work-

ers, 508 F.2d 687, 699 (3d Cir. 1975) ("inasmuch as the EEOC agreement must
be interpreted according to federal substantive [common] law, . . .the company's cause of action 'arises under' laws of United States."), vacated and remanded
on other grounds, 425 U.S. 987 (1976)).
Judge Becker conceded that a recent Supreme Court decision cast doubt on
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eral common law of employee benefit plans that governed the dispute
the applicability of the Illinois rationale to ERISA cases. 764 F.2d at 155 (citing
Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1 (1983)).
In Franchise Tax Board, a state taxing authority filed suit in state court seeking:
(1) damages for a benefit trust fund's failure to comply with tax levies and (2) a
declaration that the tax board's authority to levy taxes was not preempted by
ERISA. 463 U.S. at 7. The benefit trust fund removed the case to federal court.
Id. The district court denied the tax board's motion for remand to the state
court and then found for the tax board on the merits. Id. The benefit trust fund
appealed, and the Ninth Circuit reversed. 679 F.2d 1307 (9th Cir. 1982). On
appeal to the Supreme Court the tax board renewed its argument that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the action. 463 U.S. at 7. The Supreme
Court noted that since there was no diversity of citizenship between the parties,
removal jurisdiction would exist only if there would have been federal question
jurisdiction over the action had it originally been brought in federal court. Id. at
7-8 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1982)). The Court stated that under the wellpleaded complaint rule, a defendant may not remove a caseto federal court
unless the plaintiff's complaint establishes that the case arises under federal law.
Id. at 9-10 (quoting Taylor v. Anderson, 234 U.S. 74, 75-76 (1914)). The Court
also stated that a defendant may not establish federal jurisdiction by raising a
federal defense, including the defense of preemption, even if the defense is anticipated in the plaintiff's complaint and both parties admit that the defense is
the only question truly at issue. Id. at 12 (citing Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299
U.S. 109, 116 (1936)).
In applying these principles in Franchise Tax Board, the Court determined
that since the law that created the plaintiff's causes of action was state law, original federal question jurisdiction was unavailable "unless it appears that some
substantial, disputed question of federal law is a necessary element of one of the
well-pleaded state claims, or that one or the other claim is 'really' one of federal
law." Id. at 13.
The Court concluded that neither of the state tax board's claims involved a
substantial question of federal law. Id. at 13-22. As for the state tax board's first
cause of action, the Court determined that a straightforward application of the
well-pleaded complaint rule precluded original federal court jurisdiction because federal law became relevant only by way of the benefit trust fund's defense
of preemption. Id. at 13-14. The Court determined that the tax board's second
cause of action also was not removable because original federal jurisdiction
would have been barred. Id. at 14-22 (citing Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum
Co., 339 U.S. 667 (1950)). For a discussion of the rule of Skelly Oil, see infra note
51.
The Court then addressed the benefit trust fund's alternative argument that
the state tax board's claims were, in substance, federal claims. 463 U.S. at 22.
The Court noted that although it is true that "the party who brings a suit is
master to decide what law he will rely upon," it is also true that a plaintiff may
not defeat removal by omitting to plead necessary federal questions in a complaint. Id. at 22 (quoting The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25
(1913)). The Court noted that if a federal cause of action completely preempts a
state cause of action, any well-pleaded state claim that comes within the scope of
the federal cause of action necessarily "arises under" federal law and federal
question jurisdiction is therefore available. Id. at 22-24 (citing Avco Corp. v.
Aero Lodge No. 735, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 390 U.S. 557 (1968)). Seeking to
come within this rule, the benefit trust fund argued that ERISA was meant to
create a body of federal common law, and that "any state court action which
would require the interpretation or application of ERISA to a plan document
'arises under' the laws of the United States." 463 U.S. at 24 (quoting Brief for
Appellees at 20-21). The Court conceded that any state action coming within
the scope of one of ERISA's causes of action might be removable to federal

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol31/iss3/13

12

Dillahey: ERISA - Escape Clauses in Employee Benefit Plans Are Unenforceabl

1204

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31: p. 1192

between the ILGWU and Teamsters Funds. 4 7 Noting that section
514(a) of ERISA provided for the preemption of "any and all state laws
insofar as they.., relate to any employee benefit plan ' 4 8 and relying on
the Supreme Court's determination that Congress intended federal
courts to create federal common law to regulate ERISA plans, 49 Judge
Becker concluded that the ILGWU Fund's complaint presented a claim
that required the application of the federal common law of welfare funds
district court even if the plaintiff had pleaded an adequate state cause of action
without reference to federal law. Id. at 24. However, the Court concluded that,
in this case, neither of the state tax board's claims came within the scope of one
of ERISA's causes of action as set forth in § 502(a). Id. at 24-27. In reaching
this conclusion, the court stated:
ERISA carefully enumerates the parties entitled to seek relief under
§ 502; it does not provide anyone other than participants, beneficiaries,
or fiduciaries with an express cause of action for a declaratory judgment
on the issues in this case. A suit for similar relief by some other party
does not "arise under" that provision.
Id. at 27 (footnote omitted). The Court, therefore, vacated the judgment of the
court of appeals and ordered that the case be remanded to the state court. Id. at
28. See generally Note, FederalJurisdiction Not Present When State Seeks Declaration
That FederalLaw Does Not Preempt State's Regulation, 62 WASH. U.L.Q 307 (general
discussion of Franchise Tax Board).
Although he acknowledged that Franchise Tax Board cast some doubt on his
theory of jurisdiction, Judge Becker maintained that in Franchise Tax Board the
Supreme Court had not been presented with, and therefore had not considered,
the possibility of jurisdiction based upon federal common law in accordance
with Illinois. 764 F.2d at 155-56. Judge Becker stated that the Court in Franchise
Tax Board determined only that the suit had not "arisen under" one of ERISA's
causes of action as set forth in § 502 and not whether the suit had arisen under
federal common law. Id. Thus, he stated that Franchise Tax Board had not foreclosed such a possibility in ERISA-related actions. Id. at 156. Accordingly,
Judge Becker concluded that if the ILGWU's claim arose under federal common
law, there would be jurisdiction under the federal question statute. Id.
47. Id. Judge Becker noted that an action arises under federal law "if and
only if the complaint seeks a remedy expressly granted by a federal law or if it
requires the construction of a federal statute or a distinctive policy of a federal
statute requires the application of federal legal principles for its disposition."
Id. at 157 (quoting Lindy v. Lynn, 501 F.2d 1367, 1369 (3d Cir. 1974)). He
therefore concluded that in order to determine whether the ILGWU's claim
"arose under" federal law, it was necessary to first determine whether there existed a federal common law that governed the dispute between the two employee benefit plans. 764 F.2d at 157.
48. Id. (quoting ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1982)). See generally
Note, FederalStatutes-Preemption-NationalLabor Relations Act and Employee Retirement Income Security Act Preempt State Imposed Eligibility Requirementsfor Union Officials
Representing Casino Employees, 29 VILL. L. REV. 211 (1984) (general discussion of
federal preemption of state law under ERISA).
49. 764 F.2d at 157 (citing Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S.
504 (1981)). Judge Becker noted that inAlessi, the Supreme Court read § 514(a)
of ERISA as indicating that Congress intended to establish exclusive federal
control over pension plan regulation. 764 F.2d at 157. He further noted that in
Franchise Tax Board, the Supreme Court had stated that "the meaning and enforceability of provisions in [a] trust agreement . . .[come] within the class of
questions for which Congress intended that federal courts create federal common law." Id. (quoting 463 U.S. at 27).
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authorized by section 514(a) of ERISA. 50 Accordingly, Judge Becker
reasoned that jurisdiction over the action was authorized by the federal
question statute because the suit arose under the federal common law of
ERISA-related employee benefit plans, which was part of the laws of the
5
United States for the purposes of federal question jurisdiction. '
50. 764 F.2d at 158. Judge Becker noted that the general preemption of
state laws authorized by § 514(a) of ERISA is substantially qualified by the saving clause, which provides: "[N]othing in this subchapter shall be construed to
exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which regulates insurance, banking, or securities." Id. at 158 n.8 (quoting ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A), 29
U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1982)). Although counsel had not raised the issue,
judge Becker explained that one could argue that state court decisions regarding "other insurance" provisions are laws which regulate insurance and, therefore, were intended to be saved from preemption. Id. Judge Becker stated that
if state court decisions interpreting "other insurance" provisions were within the
saving clause and thereby saved from preemption, federal common law would
not apply and the suit would have to be dismissed for lack ofjurisdiction. Id.
Judge Becker observed that the scope of the saving clause was then under
review by the Supreme Court. Id. Without benefit of the Supreme Court's decision, Judge Becker concluded that state court decisions regarding "other insurance" provisions did not appear to be within the saving clause and were,
therefore, intended by Congress to be preempted. Id.
In support of his conclusion, Judge Becker set forth three alternative arguments. Id. First, he stated that judge-made rules regarding the interpretation of
insurance contracts were not the kind of state insurance regulations that Congress intended to save from preemption. Id. Second, he stated that the saving
clause saves from preemption only those state laws which do not conflict with
the policies or operation of ERISA. Id. (citing Attorney Gen. v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 391 Mass. 730, 732, 463 N.E.2d 548, 550 (1984), aff'd sub nom. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 105 S. Ct. 2380 (1985)). Finally, Judge Becker
indicated that when the state court decisions regarding "other insurance" provisions were applied to employee benefit plans, they were excluded from the operation of the saving clause by § 514(b)(2)(B) of ERISA. Id. (citing Wadsworth v.
Whaland, 562 F.2d 70 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 980 (1978)). Section
514(b)(2)(B) of ERISA, the deemer clause, is an exception to the saving clause
which states in relevant part that no employee benefit plan "shall be deemed to
be an insurance company or other insurer,... or to be engaged in the business
of insurance . . . for purposes of any law of any state purporting to regulate
insurance companies, insurance contracts, banks, trust companies, or investment companies." ERISA § 514(b)(2)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (1982).
Judge Becker indicated that the effect of the deemer clause is to preclude a state
from subjecting an employee benefit plan to its general insurance laws. 764
F.2d at 158 n.8. Thus, Judge Becker concluded that state court decisions regarding "other insurance" provisions were not within the saving clause by virtue
of the deemer clause when they were applied to employee benefit plans and,
therefore, they were not saved from preemption. Id.
It is submitted that the pending Supreme Court decision noted by Judge
Becker subsequently clarified the scope of the saving clause. See Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 105 S. Ct. 2380, 2390 (1985) (stating in dictum
that state laws regulating insurance contracts that apply directly to benefit plans
are exempt from saving clause by virtue of deemer clause and are, therefore,
preempted). For a further discussion of Metropolitan Life and its impact on Judge
Becker's analysis in ILGWU, see infra note 97.
51. Id. at 158. Before reaching this conclusion, Judge Becker noted that
since the case was an action for declaratory judgment, he had to insure that the
action did not violate the well-pleaded complaint rule. Id. Judge Becker stated
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Although her reasoning was different, Judge Sloviter agreed with
52
Judge Becker that the federal question statute provided jurisdiction.
She stated that in Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation
Trust, 53 the Supreme Court had expressly rejected the view that federal
question jurisdiction could be conclusively established in ERISA actions
54
merely because federal common law provided the rule of decision.
She noted, however, that in Franchise Tax Board, the Court had not entirely precluded the possibility of federal question jurisdiction in ERISA
actions. 55 In the instant case, Judge Sloviter concluded that federal
that it had been long settled that an action does not arise under federal law for
federal question jurisdiction purposes when federal law is merely raised as a
defense. Id. (citing Louisville & N. R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908)). Judge
Becker noted that, consistent with this requirement, the Supreme Court had
held that federal question jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment action does
not exist, where the plaintiff's federal claim is based on what would normally be
a defense. Id. at 158 (citing Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S.
667 (1950)). Judge Becker explained that the rule of Skelly Oil was based on the
Supreme Court's conclusion that Congress did not intend for the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act to extend the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1982)).
Judge Becker indicated that the rule of Skelly Oil precludes federal jurisdiction over a case where the plaintiff seeks a declaration that state law is not preempted by federal law. 764 F.2d at 158 (citing Franchise Tax Board v.
Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 13-22 (1983); Public Serv.
Comm'n v. Wycoff Co., 343 U.S. 237 (1952)). In contrast, he noted that federal
jurisdiction is not precluded by Skelly Oil where a plaintiff seeks a declaration that
a state law is preempted by federal law. 764 F.2d at 158-59 (citing Shaw v. Delta
Airlines, 463 U.S. 85, 96 n.14 (1983); Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp. v. Ilsley,
690 F.2d 323, 326-27 (2d Cir. 1982), aff'd sub nom. Arcudi v. Stone & Webster
Eng'g Corp., 463 U.S. 1220 (1983)). For a further discussion of Shaw, see infra
notes 56-64 and accompanying text. See generally 10A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER &

M.

KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

§ 2767 (2d ed. 1983) (discussing

question whether an action for declaratory judgment comes within federal question jurisdiction).
Judge Becker concluded that although the scope of the Skelly Oil holding is
unclear, it did not bar the ILGWU Fund's declaratory judgment action. 764
F.2d at 159. In support of this conclusion, Judge Becker stated that the ILGWU
Fund's complaint directly invoked federal law in an effort to obtain affirmative
relief. Id. Even if the complaint had been fashioned as a request for an injunction or as an action for damages, Judge Becker stated, it would have implicated
federal common law, and, therefore, there would still have been federal jurisdiction. Id. Finally,Judge Becker noted that the scope of federal jurisdiction over
ERISA-related actions would be only minimally expanded by virtue of his jurisdictional analysis because the vast majority of ERISA cases fall within the express jurisdictional provisions of § 502 of ERISA. Id. He concluded that by
finding federal question jurisdiction for the unusual case, such as ILGWU, which
does not come within § 502, the court would promote certainty and uniformity
by having federal courts decide issues of federal common law. Id.
52. 764 F.2d at 165 (Sloviter, J., concurring).
53. 463 U.S. 1 (1983). For a discussion of Franchise Tax Board, see supra
note 46 and infra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
54. 764 F.2d at 165.
55. Id. Judge Sloviter noted that although the court in Franchise Tax Board
did not find federal question jurisdiction over the suit brought by the state tax-
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question jurisdiction existed over the ILGWU claim by virtue of the
Supreme Court's decision in Shaw v. Delta Airlines,56 in which the Court
held that federal question jurisdiction extended to suits brought by employers seeking to invalidate certain state law benefit requirements on
the grounds that they were preempted by ERISA. 5 7 Judge Sloviter reconciled Shaw 58 and FranchiseTax Board5 9 by noting the significant difference between the interests at stake in the underlying suits. 6 0 She
concluded that where, as in Shaw, the plaintiffs were responsible for paying benefits under an ERISA plan and their claims related to their enforcement or payment responsibilities, jurisdiction would be found
under the federal question statute. 61 In contrast, she explained that
where, as in Franchise Tax Board, the plaintiffs' claims were only tangential to their enforcement or payment responsibilities, the federal question statute would not provide jurisdiction. 6 2 Judge Sloviter then
concluded that because the ILGWU Fund was responsible for the payment of benefits under the terms of its plan, 63 there was federal quesing authority, the Court suggested that notwithstanding this absence of an express grant of jurisdiction, a welfare benefit trust fund could obtain federal
jurisdiction to seek an injunction prohibiting the application of state regulations
that required the fund to act inconsistently with the provisions of ERISA. Id.
(quoting Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. at 20 n.20). For a further discussion of
Franchise Tax Board, see supra note 46.
56. 463 U.S. 85 (1983). In Shaw, the corporate plaintiffs brought a declaratory judgment action in federal court seeking a judgment that the New York
Human Rights law and the New York Disability Benefits Law were preempted by
ERISA. Id. at 92. The challenged state laws required employers to pay sick
leave benefits to employees who were unable to work because of pregnancy. Id.
at 90. The plaintiffs had welfare benefit plans subject to ERISA, which did not
provide employees such benefits during pregnancy. Id. at 92. If the state laws
were not preempted by ERISA, the plaintiffs would have been required to provide additional benefits to comply with the state laws. See id. at 88-89.
57. 764 F.2d at 165 (Sloviter,J., concurring). Judge Sloviter stated that, in
Shaw, the Supreme Court decided that the federal question statute provided jurisdiction because the plaintiff's were "companies subject to ERISA regulation"
who sought "injunctive relief from state regulation, on the ground that such
regulation is pre-empted by a federal statute." Id. (quoting Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96
n.14). For a discussion ofJudge Becker's views regarding the Supreme Court's
basis for jurisdiction in Shaw, see infra note 101.
58. 463 U.S. 85 (1983) (finding federal question jurisdiction over declaratory judgment action brought by employers with ERISA plans seeking declaration that state laws regarding employee benefits are preempted by ERISA).
59. 463 U.S. 1 (1983) (finding no federal question jurisdiction over suit
brought by state taxing authority seeking declaration that its right to levy taxes
on benefit fund is not preempted by ERISA).
60. 764 F.2d at 166 (Sloviter, J., concurring). Judge Sloviter noted that
Shaw and Franchise Tax Board were decided on the same day and, therefore, that
they should be read together. Id. at 165-66.
61. Id. For a further discussion of the plaintiff's claims in Shaw, see supra
note 56.
62. 764 F.2d at 166 (Sloviter, J., concurring). For a further discussion of
the plaintiff's claims in Franchise Tax Board, see infra notes 100-01.
63. 764 F.2d at 166 (Sloviter,J., concurring). Judge Sloviter noted that the
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tion jurisdiction over the ILGWU Fund's claim in accordance with
64
Shaw.
Rendering yet another theory of jurisdiction, Judge Fullam stated
that federal jurisdiction could be predicated upon the express jurisdictional grant of ERISA. 65 Because the court had express jurisdiction
over Mrs. Fazio's original claim and because no one intended to deprive
the court of jurisdiction, Judge Fullam concluded that section 502 of
ERISA provided jurisdiction, regardless of whether the action was maintained in the name of a plan beneficiary, or in the name of the personal
66
representative, assignee, or subrogee of the beneficiary.
instant suit was originally brought by a participant and beneficiary of the respective plans in order to recover benefits. Id. She concluded that the mere fact that
the ILGWU Fund had agreed to pay Mrs. Fazio's claim and then sue the Teamsters Fund to recover the benefits, had not fundamentally changed the character
of the action. Id.
64. Id. Judge Becker disagreed with Judge Sloviter's theory of how the federal question statute provided jurisdiction over the ILGWU Fund's claim in light
of Franchise Tax Board and Shaw. Id. at 156 n.7. Judge Becker stated that the
Supreme Court distinguished the two cases by noting that Franchise Tax Board
was a case "seeking a declaration that state laws were not preempted by ERISA."
Id. at 157 n.7 (quoting Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96 n.14 (emphasis in original)). Judge
Becker stated that, in Franchise Tax Board, the Court held that federal question
jurisdiction did not arise over such a claim in part because it violated the rule of
Skelly Oil. Id. For a further discussion of Judge Becker's reasoning concerning
the jurisdictional issue and the rule of Skelly Oil, see supra note 51. Judge Becker
noted that, in contrast to Franchise Tax Board, the claim in Shaw sought a declaration that state laws "are preempted by ERISA." Id. (quoting Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96
n. 14 (emphasis in original)). Judge Becker stated that the Shaw court held that
the plaintiff's preemption claim clearly presented a federal question because it
directly implicated the supremacy clause of the Constitution. Id. Judge Becker
therefore concluded:
The claim in Shaw was thus held to be jurisdictional under [the federal
question statute], not because of the strength of the plaintiff's ERISA
claim, as Judge Sloviter would have it, but because it was a preemption
case arising under the Constitution ....
But, because Shaw relied on
the Supremacy Clause as the basis for jurisdiction over a pre-emption
claim, and there is no pre-emption issue in the case before us, Shaw
does not provide a specific rationale for [federal question] jurisdiction
here.
Id.
65. Id. at 166 (Fullam, J., concurring). Judge Fullam explained that in the
original action brought by Mrs. Fazio, each of the defendant plans had had the
right to attempt to shift liability to the other, whether by way of contribution,
indemnity, or declaratory judgment. Id. He stated that § 502 plainly provided
jurisdiction over all aspects of the original controversy. Id. at 166-67 (Fullam,J.,
concurring). Accordingly, Judge Fullam indicated that the federal question jurisdictional issue did not need to be addressed. Id. at 167 (Fullam, J., concurring). Judges Becker and Sloviter disagreed with Judge Fullam's conclusion that
§ 502 of ERISA provided jurisdiction. Id. at 154. For a discussion of Judge
Becker's theory of federal jurisdiction, see supra notes 46-51 and accompanying
text. For a discussion ofJudge Sloviter's theory of federal jurisdiction, see supra
notes 52-64 and accompanying text.
66. Id. Since there was jurisdiction over the original action brought by Mrs.
Fazio, Judge Fullam stated that it was necessary to decide whether the proce-
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Turning to the merits of the case, the court noted that the conflict
between the "other insurance" provisions presented an issue of first impression under the federal common law of benefit plans covered by ERISA. 6 7 Borrowing from state common law, the court formulated a twopronged analysis for resolving disputes concerning the coverage of
overlapping employee benefit plans. 68 First, the Third Circuit stated
that the courts should uphold the intent of the trustees of the competing
benefit plans by enforcing the "other insurance" provisions if the provisions are compatible. 69 Second, the court stated that the provisions of a
benefit plan should be enforced only if they do not conflict with the laws
70
and policies of ERISA.
Applying this analysis, the court first tried to discern the intent of
the trustees of each plan by examining the "other insurance" provisions. 7 1 The court noted that the excess clause in the Teamsters plan
purported to shift primary liability for Mrs. Fazio's bills to the ILGWU
plan if the ILGWU plan provided Mrs. Fazio with any coverage. 7 2 The
court observed, however, that the escape clause in the ILGWU plan purdures chosen by the district court to resolve the controversy deprived the court
of federal jurisdiction. Id, at 167 (Fullam, J., concurring). He observed that
neither the district court nor any of the litigants intended to deprive the court of
jurisdiction. Id. He also noted that everyone intended that the ILGWU plan be
subrogated to Mrs. Fazio's rights against the Teamsters plan. Id. Finally, Judge
Fullam stated: "I do not believe this Court should be deterred from deciding
the important federal issues presented in this litigation by the procedural formalities unfortunately, and inadvertently, pursued in the district court. This
Court should not be so tyrannized by district court docket numbers." Id.
67. For a discussion of the basis for the federal common law of benefit
plans, see supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text.
68. 764 F.2d at 159. The Court recognized that this type of dispute was a
common occurrence in the insurance industry and was the subject of extensive
state common law jurisprudence and, therefore, the court looked to state common law for guidance. Id.
69. Id. The general rule under state common law treatment of insurance
clauses is that "the liability of insurers under overlapping coverage policies is to
be governed by the intent of the insurers as manifested by the terms of the policies which they have issued." 16 CoucH ON INSURANCE 2n § 62:44 at 480 (rev'd
ed. 1983); see, e.g., Starks v. Hospital Serv. Plan, 182 N.J. Super. 342, 351, 440
A.2d 1353, 1358 (App. Div. 1981) ("the judicial task is first to determine from
the contracts themselves what obligations the respective obligors intended to
assume") aff'd, 91 N.J. 433, 453 A.2d 159 (1982).
70. 764 F.2d at 159. The second inquiry under state common law regarding competing insurance clauses is to determine whether the enforcement of a
clause would be against public policy. 8A C. APPLEMAN, supra note 11, § 4907.65
at 367 ("where such contractual provisions are not inconsistent with public policy, they will be enforced"). The Third Circuit accepted ERISA as the source of
public policy concerning employee benefit plans. See 764 F.2d at 159.
71. Id. at 160-61. For the text of the other insurance provisions in these
policies, see supra notes 23-26.
72. Id. at 161. The pertinent provision in the Teamsters plan indicated that
if "an individual is covered" by another group insurance plan, and that plan
covers "the patient directly, rather than as an employee's dependent," then that
plan is the primary insurer and the Teamsters Fund is the excess insurer. Id. at
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ported to provide coverage only if the Teamsters plan did not. 73 Based
on the language of the plans' "other insurance" provisions, the court
concluded that the provisions were plainly incompatible and, therefore,
provided no basis for determining which plan should provide
74
coverage.
In applying the second prong of its analysis, the court again relied
on state common law, this time reviewing judicial treatment of escape
clauses in insurance contracts. 75 The court observed that, when faced
with a conflict between an excess clause and an escape clause, the majority of state courts have held that excess clauses should prevail. 76 The
160. For the complete text of the Teamsters plan's Coordination of Benefits
provision, see supra note 25.
73. 764 F.2d at 161. The "Exception to Eligibility" clause of the ILGWU
plan indicated that the ILGWU Fund intended to escape all liability whenever a
participant or beneficiary was covered by his or her spouse's group insurer, if
less than 50% of the cost of such coverage was paid for by the insured. Id. For
the complete text of the ILGWU plan's "Exception to Eligibility" clause, see
supra note 23. The parties stipulated to the fact that the entire cost of Mr.
Fazio's coverage was paid for by his employer. 764 F.2d at 161 n.12. Thus, Mrs.
Fazio came within the "Exception to Eligibility" clause. Id.
74. 764 F.2d at 161. The court noted that in light of the two "other insurance" provisions, each plan, in effect, intended to provide primary coverage unless the other plan provided primary coverage. Id.
75. Id. at 162. The court focused its analysis on the ILGWU Fund's escape
clause because the Teamsters Fund claimed that this clause conflicted with the
laws and policies of ERISA. Id. at 150. The court did not analyze the Teamsters
Fund's excess clause because the ILGWU Fund had not challenged its validity.
Id. at 162 n.13. Moreover, the court noted that there was nothing on the face of
the Teamsters' excess provision to indicate that the Teamsters' trustees had violated ERISA. Id.
76. Id. at 162. Some state courts, when faced with a conflict between an
excess and an escape clause, have relied on both contract principles and public
policy considerations to hold that the excess clause prevails. See, e.g., Insurance
Co. of N. Am. v. Continental Casualty Co., 575 F.2d 1070 (3d Cir. 1978) (court
refuses to enforce escape clause over excess clause in order to fully protect insured up to total coverage of both policies); Rocky Mountain Fire & Casualty Co.
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 107 Ariz. 227, 485 P.2d 552 (1971) (escape clause unenforceable as violative of public policy); Grasberger v. Liebert & Obert, Inc., 335
Pa. 491, 6 A.2d 925 (1939) (since policy with excess clause does not cover insured's primary loss, policy with escape clause must be primary insurer). Other
state courts when faced with incompatible "other insurance" clauses have declared the clauses to be "mutually repugnant" and have held both insurers primarily liable for the insured's loss on a pro-rata basis. See, e.g., Union Ins. Co. v.
Iowa Hardward Mut. Ins. Co., 175 N.W.2d 413 (Iowa 1970); Cotton v. Associated Indem. Corp., 200 So.2d 78 (La. App.), cert. denied, 251 La. 71, 203 So.2d 88
(1967).
The Third Circuit doubted whether a state court could conclude that an
excess clause was controlling simply from contract principles. Id. at 162 n.14.
The court noted that those state courts that purportedly had relied on contract
analysis in finding that the excess clause prevailed had reached their conclusions
by starting from the premise that the policy with the excess clause does not
cover the insured's primary loss. Id. The court explained that this premise begs
the question because
[t]he policy with the excess clause does not cover the insured's primary
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Third Circuit recognized that the policy underlying these decisions was
to ensure that people do not lose the level of coverage that they reasonably expect to receive under their own insurance policy merely because
their insurer has attempted to shift liability to another policy, which may
contain terms that are less favorable to the insured. 7 7 With this policy in
mind, the court proceeded to determine whether "other insurance"
clauses violate the provisions and policies of ERISA and are, therefore,
unenforceable. 78 The court explained that the responsibility for administering a plan rests with the plan's trustees, who are required to act
in accordance with ERISA's standard of fiduciary conduct. 79 The court
stated that under that standard, a decision by plan trustees to deny benefits to participants or beneficiaries is valid unless it was arbitrary and
capricious.80

loss only if the policy with the escape clause does. But the escape
clause, of course, purports to deny coverage to the insured in the presence of the other policy. It may be that in terms solely of contract principles the proper conclusion when faced with a conflict between two
such clauses is to hold that they are incompatible.
Id.

77. Id. at 162 (citing Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Continental Casualty Co.,
575 F.2d 1070, 1074 n.6 (3d Cir. 1978)).
78. Id. at 162.
79. Id. Regarding the fiduciary duty of trustees, ERISA provides in pertinent part that
a fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the
interest of the participants and beneficiaries and(A) for the exclusive purpose of:
(i) providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries;
and
(ii) defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan;
(B) with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and
familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of
a like character and with like aims ...
ERISA § 404, 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (1982).
80. 764 F.2d at 163 (citing Struble v. NewJersey Brewery Employees' Welfare Trust Fund, 732 F.2d 325 (3d Cir. 1984)). In Struble, the Third Circuit
discussed the different standards to which fiduciaries are held under ERISA.
732 F.2d at 332-34. The Struble court noted that ERISA requires that all fiduciaries act "solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries" (the "duty of
loyalty") and with the "care, skill, prudence, and diligence" of a prudent man
acting in like circumstances (the "duty of care"). Id. at 332-33 (quoting ERISA
§ 404(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1982)). The Struble court stated that a decision by
trustees to deny benefits to particular claimants meets the ERISA standards unless that decision is "arbitrary and capricious." Id. at 333. The "arbitrary and
capricious" standard is derived from § 302(c)(5)(B) of the Labor Management
Relations Act. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5)(B) (1982)). Since ILGWU involved the denial of benefits to a particular claimant, the Third Circuit applied
the "arbitrary and capricious" standard to assess the fiduciary's decision. 764
F.2d at 163.
The court recognized that trustees are required to strike a balance between
the interests of present beneficiaries and the interests of future beneficiaries. Id.
at 163 (citing Edwards v. Wilkes-Barre Publishing Co. Pension Trust, 757 F.2d
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In determining whether the incorporation of escape clauses in benefit plans constituted arbitrary and capricious conduct, the court first
noted that an important congressional policy underlying ERISA was to
insure that employees enrolled in a benefit plan receive all the compensation that they reasonably anticipated under the plan's purported coverage.8 1 The court observed that escape clauses, unlike excess clauses,
purport to shift all liability to an alternative plan and do not allow a
82
participant to return to his original plan for the difference in coverage.
The court reasoned, therefore, that an employee covered by a plan with
an escape clause would lose coverage under his original plan if he happened to be covered under another benefit plan, even if the benefits he
is entitled to receive under the other plan are much less favorable than
those of his original plan.8 3 Such a loss of coverage, the court stated,
would be a denial of reasonably anticipated benefits, contravening the
congressional policy underlying ERISA. 84 Accordingly, the court held
that escape clauses in ERISA-covered employee benefit plans reflect arbitrary and capricious conduct by the trustees and are, therefore, unen85
forceable as a matter of law.
52, 56 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 130 (1985)). In Edwards, beneficiaries of a
retirement plan, filed suit to compel a recalculation of their pension benefits. Id.
at 54. The court, realizing that any increase in benefits to this group of beneficiaries would result in less money being available for other beneficiaries, held
that the trustees had not acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner. Id. at 58.

The court stated that "trustees are under no obligation to interpret the Plan in
such a way as to benefit any particular group of beneficiaries to the detriment of
others, and the mere fact that they choose not to do so is not, standing alone,
any indication of arbitrary or capricious conduct." Id. at 57. Based on this reasoning, the ILGWU court concluded that an "other insurance" clause in an ERISA-covered benefit plan is enforceable unless it reflects arbitrary and capricious
judgment by the plan's trustees. 764 F.2d at 163.
81. Id. (quoting ERISA § 2(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1982)). For the text of
Congress' declaration of policy supporting ERISA, see supra note 3 and accompanying test.

82. 764 F.2d at 163. For a further discussion of excess and escape clauses,
see supra note 11.
83. 764 F.2d at 163. The court acknowledged that a participant or beneficiary who was enrolled in a benefit plan containing an escape clause could protect
himself by declining to participate in a plan with inferior coverage. Id. at 164
n.16. The court believed, however, that given the complexity of "other insurance" law, most participants would not make informed choices but would instead become eligible for benefits from overlapping plans without realizing the
potential problems until one plan refused to pay for costs apparently within its
coverage. Id.

84. Id. at 163.

85. Id. at 164. The court recognized that if escape clauses were enforceable, trustees who incorporated such clauses would be able to defer liability to
other plans and might be able to use the money saved to provide their participants and beneficiaries with better coverage. Id. at 163-64 n.16. The court
stated, however, that "trustees may not, consistent with their fiduciary responsibilities, sacrifice the welfare of some participants-who find that they are entitled
only to the inferior coverage provided by another plan-in order to benefit
other participants and beneficiaries." Id. at 164 n.16.
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After finding the escape clause unenforceable, the court determined
that the incompatibility between the two plans had disappeared. 86 The
court then determined that the ILGWU plan was liable for Mrs. Fazio's
medical expenses under both its own terms and the terms of the Teamsters plan. 8 7 Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's judgment and remanded the case with directions to enter judgment in favor
88
of the Teamsters Fund.
In reviewing the court's jurisdictional analysis, it is submitted that
the Third Circuit correctly refused to follow the liberal interpretations
of section 502 adopted by the Seventh 8 9 and Ninth Circuits. 90 Instead,
86. Id. at 161.
87. Id. at 164. With the escape clause in the ILGWU plan unenforceable,
the remaining provisions of the plan provided primary coverage. Id. at 161.
The Teamsters plan, with its excess clause intact, provided secondary or excess
insurance in the face of the primary coverage afforded by the ILGWU plan. Id.
at 164. For the relevant text of the ILGWU plan, see supra note 23. For the
relevant text of the Teamsters plan, see supra note 25.
88. 764 F.2d at 164.
89. International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers
Local No. 111 v. Douglas, 646 F.2d 1211 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 866
(1981). For a discussion of Iron Workers, see supra note 37. In Iron Workers, the
Seventh Circuit made no attempt to reconcile its holding that a labor union had
standing to sue under § 502(a)(1)(B) of ERISA with the fact that the express
words of the statutory provision do not include unions among the persons or
entities that are entitled to bring suit. See 646 F.2d at 1214.
90. Fentron Indus. v. National Shopmen Pension Fund, 674 F.2d 1300 (9th
Cir. 1982). For a discussion of Fentron, see supra note 37. The Second Circuit
has expressly rejected the jurisdictional analysis followed in Fentron. See Pressroom Unions-Printers League Income Sec. Fund v. Continental Assurance Co.,
700 F.2d 889, 892 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 463 U.S. 1233, cert. denied, 464 U.S.
845 (1983). In Pressroom, a pension fund sued officers and stockholders of a consulting firm which allegedly caused the pension fund to enter into insurance
contracts at exorbitant rates. Id. at 891. Jurisdiction over the action was predicated on § 502 of ERISA. Id. After noting that the jurisdictional provisions of
ERISA do not expressly authorize a pension fund to assert a cause of action, the
court rejected the pension fund's argument that jurisdiction over the action nevertheless existed in accordance with the Ninth Circuit's decision in Fentron. Id. at
891-92. In Pressroom, the Second Circuit agreed with the Ninth Circuit that the
legislative history was silent as to whether Congress intended to grant federal
jurisdiction over suits by parties not specified in § 502. Id. at 892. The Second
Circuit, however, chose to read that silence as indicating that federal jurisdiction
did not, rather than did, exist. Id. Accordingly, the Pressroomcourt dismissed the
action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 893.
The Second Circuit again criticized the Fentron analysis in Tuvia Convalescent Center v. National Union of Hosp. & Health Care Employees, 717 F.2d 726
(2d Cir. 1983). In that case a nursing home brought suit against an employee
welfare benefit plan and its trustees alleging that the trustees had violated their
fiduciary duties. Id. at 727-28. The nursing home, relying on Fentron, claimed
that it had standing to sue under § 502 of ERISA by virtue of its status as an
employer. Id. at 730. Relying on Pressroom, the Second Circuit again refused to
follow Fentron and dismissed the suit for lack ofjurisdiction. Id. at 730 (citing
Pressroom, 700 F.2d 889; Fentron, 674 F.2d 1300).
Subsequently, the Ninth Circuit declined an opportunity to expand the
scope of Fentron. See Chase v. Trustees of W. Conference of Teamsters Pension
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the court appropriately recognized that the federal courts are courts of
limited jurisdiction and focused on whether Congress intended to grant,
rather than preclude subject matter jurisdiction over suits brought by parties not listed in section 502.91 Because section 502 of ERISA does not
expressly authorize jurisdiction over an action brought by a pension
fund and because there is no indication in the legislative history of ER92
ISA that Congress intended to grant jurisdiction over such an action,
it is suggested that the Third Circuit correctly concluded that the jurisdictional provisions of ERISA did not authorize federal jurisdiction over
the ILGWU Fund's claim.
Because the procedures suggested by the district court inadver93
tently deprived the parties ofjurisdiction pursuant to ERISA, it is sug-

gested that the Third Circuit was eager to find alternative grounds for
federal jurisdiction over the action. In comparing each judge's theory of
Trust Fund, 753 F.2d 744, 748 (9th Cir. 1985). In Chase, a suit was brought by
approximately one hundred taxi-cab drivers for restitution of funds paid to a
pension fund. Id. at 746. The Chase court noted that the plaintiff in Fentron was a
single, undivided corporate entity while the plaintiffs in Chase comprised only a
part of a larger corporate entity. Id. at 748. For this reason the court declined
to apply the Fentron analysis and instead remanded the action to the district
court with directions to consider whether the plaintiffs could be considered participants of the trust and therefore entitled to sue under ERISA. Id. By refusing
to apply the Fentron analysis in Chase, it is suggested that the Ninth Circuit may
have indicated its reluctance to rely on Fentron and at least indicated that it intends to construe the Fentron holding narrowly.
91. See, e.g., Pressroom Unions-Printers League Income Sec. Fund v. Continental Assurance Co., 700 F.2d 889, 892 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 463 U.S. 1233,
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 845 (1983). For a discussion of Pressroom, see supra note 90.
In rejecting the pension fund's argument that federal jurisdiction over the action
existed despite the lack of an express grant ofjurisdiction in ERISA, the Second
Circuit stated: "[i]t is beyond dispute that only Congress is empowered to grant
and extend the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal judiciary, and that
courts are not to infer a grant ofjurisdiction absent a clear legislative mandate."
700 F.2d at 892 (citing Rice v. Railroad Co., 66 U.S. (1 Black) 358, 374 (1862);
Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 30-31 (1953)). After determining that
there was no evidence that Congress intended to grant jurisdiction over the pension fund's claim, the court dismissed the action. Id. at 893.
Additionally, in Franchise Tax Board, the Supreme Court impliedly affirmed
the Second Circuit's strict reading of § 502 of ERISA. See 463 U.S. 1. In remanding the state taxing authority's suit to the state court for lack ofjurisdiction, the Supreme Court stated that "ERISA carefully enumerates the parties
entitled to seek relief under § 502; it does not provide anyone other than participants, beneficiaries, or fiduciaries with an express cause of action for a declaratory judgment on the issues in this case." Id. at 27. For a further discussion of
Franchise Tax Board, see supra note 46.
92. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4639, 5038, 5109; see also Pressroom Unions-Printers
League Income Sec. Fund v. Continental Assurance Co., 700 F.2d 889, 892 (2d
Cir.), cert. dismissed, 463 U.S. 1233, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 845 (1983) (ERISA's
legislative history silent as to whether Congress intended to grant subject matter
jurisdiction over suits by parties not listed in § 502).
93. For a discussion of the procedures followed in the district court, see
supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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federal jurisdiction, it is submitted that Judge Becker's view is the most
sound. 9 4 Judge Sloviter disagreed withJudge Becker's view that the federal question statute provides jurisdiction over ERISA actions when the
plaintiff's claims arise under federal common law, because she believed
that the Supreme Court had expressly rejected that possibility in
Franchise Tax Board.95 However, in Franchise Tax Board, the Court determined that a defendant could not establish removal jurisdiction over the
plaintiff's state law claims, in part because the plaintiff's claims did not
arise under one of ERISA's causes of action. The Court did not address the

issue of whether original federal question jurisdiction is available when a
plaintiff's claims arise under the federal common law developed pursuant to

ERISA. 96 It is submitted, therefore, that Franchise Tax Board did not
foreclose such a possibility and that federal question jurisdiction existed
over the ILGWU Fund's claim because it arose under federal common
law.

97

94. For a discussion of Judge Becker's theory of federal jurisdiction, see
supra notes 45-51 and accompanying text.
95. 764 F.2d at 165 (Sloviter, J., concurring). For a discussion of Franchise
Tax Board and Judge Becker's view on how Franchise Tax Board could be distin-

guished, see supra note 46. Judge Sloviter supported her position by stating:
Judge Becker's broad view that merely because federal common law
supplies the rule of decision, there is "arising under"jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1331 was before the Supreme Court and expressly rejected
in Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust. The Court
stated that, "CLVT [the state tax board] (sic) argues by analogy that
ERISA ...was meant ot create a body of federal common law, and that
,any state court action which would require the interpretation of application of ERISA to a plan document 'arises under' the laws of the

United States.' " The Court concluded, however, that this did not suffice to create federal subject matter jurisdiction.

764 F.2d at 165 (Sloviter, J., concurring) (citations omitted).

However, in

Franchise Tax Board, "CLVT" was not the state tax board, as Judge Sloviter indicated, but was rather the defendant benefit trust fund who was seeking to establish removal jurisdiction. See 463 U.S. at 4-5. It is submitted, therefore, that the
Court in Franchise Tax Board was not presented with the issue of whether federal
question jurisdiction is available when a plaintiff's claims arise under the federal
common law developed pursuant to ERISA.
96. For a discussion of Franchise Tax Board, see supra note 46.
97. A Supreme Court case decided after ILGWU supports Judge Becker's

conclusion that the applicable state law was preempted and that federal common
law governed the dispute. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 105

S. Ct. 2380 (1985). For a discussion ofJudge Becker's reasoning on this issue,
see supra notes 45-51 and accompanying text.
In Metropolitan Life, the Massachusetts Attorney General sued several insurance companies to enforce a state law which required insurers to include certain
minimum health care benefits in their general insurance policies. Id. at 2386.
The insurance companies claimed that the state law was preempted by ERISA.
Id. at 2385. In reviewing the applicable statutory provisions of ERISA, the
Court explained that ERISA contains a broad preemption provision, which declares that the federal statute shall "supersede any and all State laws insofar as
they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan." Id. (quoting
ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)(1982)). The Court stated that the general
preemption provision of § 514(a) was substantially qualified by the saving clause
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It is submitted that support is lacking for Judge Sloviter's view that
found in § 514(b)(2)(A), which provides that, with one exception, nothing in
ERISA "shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any
state which regulates insurance, banking, or securities." Id. at 2385-86 (quoting
ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1982)). The court further explained that the one exception to the saving clause is found in § 514(b)(2)(B),
the deemer clause, which provides that no employee benefit plan "shall be
deemed to be an insurance company or other insurer.., or to be engaged in the
business of insurance . . . for purposes of any law of any State purporting to
regulate insurance companies, insurance contracts, banks, trust companies, or
investment companies." Id. at 2386 (quoting ERISA § 514(b)(2)(B), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1144(b)(2)(B) (1982)). In Metropolitan Life, the insurers argued that the mandated benefits law was a law that "relate[s] to" an employee benefit plan and
was, therefore, preempted by § 514(a) of ERISA. Id. at 2385 (quoting ERISA
§ 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1982)). The Commonwealth argued that its mandated benefits law was a "law... which regulates insurance" within the meaning
of the saving clause, and was, therefore, saved from the general preemption
clause of ERISA. Id. at 2386 (quoting ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1144(b)(2)(A) (1982)).
The Supreme Court determined that the state mandated benefits law fell
within the scope of the general preemption clause of § 514(a), and then considered whether the law nevertheless was saved from preemption by the saving
clause of § 514(b)(2)(A). 105 S. Ct. at 2389. In determining the relationship
between these provisions the Court observed:
The two pre-emption sections, while clear enough on their faces, perhaps are not a model of legislative drafting, for while the general preemption clause broadly preempts state law, the saving clause appears
broadly to preserve the States' lawmaking power over much of the same
regulation. While Congress occasionally decides to return to the States
what is has previously taken away, it does not normally do both at the
same time.
Id. (footnote omitted). The Court stated that because the mandated benefits law
regulated the terms of certain insurance contracts, it seemed to be saved from
preemption based on the plain meaning of § 514(b)(2)(A), as a law "which regulates insurance." Id. at 2390 (quoting ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1144(b)(2)(A) (1982)). Additionally, the Court looked beyond the plain meaning of the statute to the McCarran-Ferguson Act's definition of "business of insurance" in order to determine the intent of Congress when it drafted ERISA.
Id. at 2391 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1982) (providing for the continued
regulation and taxation of the business of insurance by the states)). The Court
stated that the Act strongly supported the conclusion that regulations regarding
the substantive terms of insurance contracts are squarely within the saving
clause as laws "which regulate insurance." Id. at 2391. Because of the plain
language of the saving clause and the traditional understanding of insurance
regulations as evidenced by the McCarran-Ferguson Act, the Court concluded
that the state-mandated benefits law was saved from preemption by the operation of the saving clause. Id. at 2391-92. The Court stressed that nothing in the
language, structure, or legislative history of ERISA supported a narrow reading
of the saving clause, and the Court, therefore, declined to impose any limitations
on the savings clause beyond those imposed in the clause itself. Id. at 2393.
In ILG WU, Judge Becker noted that, although the parties had not raised the
issue, one could argue that state laws regarding "other insurance" provisions
are laws "which [regulate] insurance" and are therefore saved from preemption.
764 F.2d at 158 n.8. Without benefit of the Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Metropolitan Life, Judge Becker concluded that the saving clause was inapplicable in ILGWU and, therefore, that the state laws were preempted by
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federal jurisdiction existed because as in Shaw, 98 the plaintiff was re§ 514(a) by ERISA. Id. For a discussion ofJudge Becker's reasoning regarding
the inapplicability of the saving clause, see supra note 50.
Examining Judge Becker's reasoning in light of the subsequent Metropolitan
Life decision, it is submitted that although his ultimate conclusion remains
sound, only one of his three supporting arguments is valid. Judge Becker's first
contention that judge-made rules concerning the interpretation of insurance
contracts are not within the saving clause is contradicted by Metropolitan Life and
ERISA itself. See Metropolitan Life, 105 S. Ct. 2380, 2389-93; see also ERISA
§ 514(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(c)(1) (1982) (defining "state laws" for purposes of
the preemption provisions as including "all laws, decisions, rules, regulations,
:. . of any state"). It is submitted that this definition communicates Congress'
intent to subject state decisional laws to the preemption provisions of § 514. It
is also submitted that applying the criteria set forth in MetropolitanLife, state laws
regarding other insurance provisions are laws "which [regulate] insurance"
within the meaning of the saving clause. See MetropolitanLife, 105 S. Ct. 2389-93.
In Metropolitan Life, the Supreme Court relied on the McCarran-Ferguson Act's
definition of "business of insurance" to determine the scope of ERISA's saving
clause. 105 S. Ct. at 2391. The Court stated:
Congress was concerned [in the McCarran-Ferguson Act] with the type
of state regulation that centers around the contract of insurance ...
The relationship between the insurer and insured, the type of policy which
could be issued, its reliability, its interpretation, and enforcement-these
were the core of the 'business of insurance.' [T]he focus [of the statutory term] was on the relationship between the insurance company and
the policy holder. Statutes aimed at protecting or regulating this relationship, directly or indirectly are laws regulating the 'business of
insurance.'
Id. (quoting SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 460 (1969) (emphasis added)). It is suggested that state laws regarding "other insurance" provisions
likewise center around the contract of insurance by deciding issues of policy interpretation and enforcement and, therefore, are laws "which [regulate] insurance" within the meaning of the saving clause.
Judge Becker's second contention that the saving clause saves from preemption only those state laws which do not conflict with the policies or operation of
ERISA was expressly rejected in Metropolitan Life. 105 S. Ct. at 2393 (refusing to
adopt Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts's interpretation that saving
clause saves from preemption only those laws unrelated to substantive provisions of ERISA).
It is submitted that Judge Becker's conclusion that the saving clause was
inapplicable in ILGWU remains valid after Metropolitan Life because, as Judge
Becker finally contended, the deemer clause exempts state laws regarding
"other insurance" provisions from the operation of the saving clause when the
state laws are applied directly to employee benefit plans. See Metropolitan Life,
105 S. Ct. at 2390 (stating that deemer clause exempts from saving clause all
state laws regulating insurance contracts when state laws apply directly to benefit plans). Because the state laws regarding "other insurance" provisions in
ILGWU were to be applied directly to the competing benefit plans in order to
resolve the dispute, it is submitted that Judge Becker was correct in determining
that the deemer clause exempts these laws from the operation of the saving
clause. Consequently, it is submitted that Judge Becker properly determined
that these state laws are preempted by the general preemption provision of
§ 514(a), and that federal common law should govern the dispute. For a further
discussion ofJudge Becker's reasoning and conclusion on the preemption issue
in ILGWU, see supra note 50.
98. For a discussion of Shaw, see supra note 56.
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sponsible for the payment of benefits under an ERISA plan.9 9 In Shaw
the Court stated that because the plaintiff had asked for a declaration
that ERISA preempted certain state laws, the claim invoked the
supremacy clause of the Constitution. 10 0 The claim in Shaw, therefore,
was held to present a federal question, not because of the nature of the
plaintiffs' ERISA claim as Judge Sloviter suggested, but because the action arose under the Constitution.' 0 ' Because the ILGWU claims did
not raise a preemption issue, 10 2 it is submitted that Shaw does not pro10 3
vide a basis for jurisdiction in the instant case.
It is submitted that Judge Fullam's view that jurisdiction existed
under section 502 of ERISA also lacks support. Even though the parties
intended that the ILGWU Fund should be subrogated to Mrs. Fazio's
rights as Judge Fullam suggested, 10 4 no assignment was, in fact,
made.' 0 5 Because the federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, it
is submitted that the express jurisdictional grant of ERISA cannot be
interpreted based on the parties' intent 10 6 and that jurisdiction over the
ILGWU Fund's claim cannot be found in section 502.107
Addressing the court's decision on the merits, it is noted that the
Third Circuit proclaimed that under state common law the "majority
rule is that escape clauses are disfavored and are not enforced as against
99. For a discussion of Judge Sloviter's theory of jurisdiction, see supra
notes 52-64 and accompanying text.
100. 463 U.S. at 96 n.14. The Court in Shaw distinguished Franchise Tax
Board by noting that the plaintiff in Franchise Tax Board had brought "an action
seeking a declaration that state laws were not preempted by ERISA." Id. at 96
n. 14 (emphasis in original). The Court in Franchise Tax Board held that the claim
did not present a federal question, in part, because the claim violated the rule of
Skelly Oil. 463 U.S. at 15-24; see generally Mann, FederalJurisdictionover Preemption
Claims: A Post-FranchiseTax Board Analysis, 62 TEx. L. REV. 893 (1983-84) (discussion of preemption claims in light of Franchise Tax Board). For a discussion of the
rule of Skelly Oil, see supra note 51.
101. 463 U.S. at 96 n.14.
102. The ILGWU Fund did not challenge the validity of the Teamsters
Fund's excess clause. 764 F.2d at 162 n.13. However, because the Teamsters
Fund claimed that the trustees of the ILGWU Fund had violated their fiduciary
duty under ERISA by incorporating the escape clause, it is submitted that, had
the district court directed the Teamsters Fund to pay Mrs. Fazio's claims and
then institute suit against the ILGWU Fund, a preemption issue would have
been raised and jurisdiction over the action could have been predicated upon
Shaw.
103. Judge Becker, in rejecting Judge Sloviter's argument, concluded that
"because Shaw relied on the Supremacy Clause as the basis for jurisdiction over
a pre-emption claim, and there is no pre-emption issue in the case before us,
Shaw does not provide a specific rationale for [federal question] jurisdiction
here." 764 F.2d at 157 n.7.
104. Id. at 167 (Fullam, J., concurring).
105. Id. at 154 n.6.
106. For a discussion of why the jurisdictional grant of ERISA must be read
narrowly and literally, see supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
107. For the text of the jurisdictional grant of § 502 of ERISA, see supra
note 4.
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excess clauses .... ,,108 In reaching this conclusion, the court did not
discuss the fact that, in certain situations, state courts have viewed escape clauses as appropriate and have enforced them over excess
clauses.' 0 9 These situations generally arise when an insurer, as a convenience to its insured, extends a limited amount of coverage in unusual
circumstances, for instance when a totally uninsured driver borrows the
insured's car. 110 In such circumstances, if it is later determined that the
person who borrowed the car had valid insurance, state courts have
honored escape clauses in the owners' insurance policies in order to encourage insurance companies to continue to extend such coverage." '1
Similarly, it is suggested that trustees of an ERISA benefit plan might
decide to provide limited coverage in unusual situations if the plan
could escape liability when alternative coverage was available. The
court, however, precluded this possibility by concluding that all escape
clauses violate ERISA as a matter of law and are, therefore, unenforceable.' 12 It is suggested that this conclusion precludes the emergence of
permissible ERISA escape clauses, notwithstanding the fact that, in limited situations, state courts permit escape clauses as a matter of public
108. 764 F.2d at 162.
109. See id.
110. See generally 8A C. APPLEMAN, supra note 11, § 4910; 16 COUCH ON INSURANCE 2D

§ 62:76 (2d ed. 1984). One of the most common of these situations

arises when a garage, engaged in repairing a customer's automobile, permits the
customer to drive one of the garage's vehicles during the repair period. C. ApPLEMAN, supra, at 351. If the customer's coverage continues while he is driving
the borrowed car, some state courts have honored the exclusion in the garage's
policy which specifically denies coverage over loaned automobiles if other insurance is available. Id. Similarly, escape clauses have been held valid and controlling under state common law treatment of automobile insurance in a number of
other situations including coverage of automobile dealers and newly acquired
autos. Id. at 462.
111. See, e.g., Faltersack v. Vanden Boogaard, 39 Wis. 2d 64, 158 N.W.2d
322 (1968) (escape clause in garage's liability policy upheld when garage's vehicle loaned to customer who was having his own car serviced); State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 331 So. 2d 638 (Ala. 1976) (holding
enforceable and controlling a garage owner's policy that extended coverage to
additional insureds only if they had no other coverage available).
112. 764 F.2d at 164. It is suggested that earlier in the opinion the Third
Circuit implied that some escape clauses in ERISA benefit plans may be enforceable. The court had stated:
Finally, we conclude that the decision of trustees to incorporate an escape clause in a benefit plan-through which the plan attempts to escape all liability if a participant or beneficiary is covered by another
plan, regardless of the level of benefits provided by the other planconstitutes arbitrary and capricious conduct.
Id. at 149-50. Thus, the court implied that an escape clause which deferred liability only to other plans which provided the insured with a similar level of benefits may be enforceable. However, the court dispelled any such implication
when, later in the opinion, the court clearly stated that "escape clauses in ERISA
covered employee benefit plans are unenforceable as a matter of law." Id. at
164.
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By virtue of the ILGWU decision, trustees of plans that have incorporated escape clauses undoubtedly will recast their escape clauses into
excess clauses in an attempt to enforceably shift some of their liability to
alternative plans.' 14 In the event that plans dispute their liability under
these newly written excess clauses, it is submitted that courts will find
similarly worded excess clauses incompatible under the federal common
law governing ERISA plans.' '5 The Third Circuit has indicated that incompatible clauses should be declared "mutually repugnant" and that
both plans should be held primarily liable for the insured's loss on a
pro-rata basis. 116 If state law is once again relied on, the Third Circuit
will require that both plans prorate the loss up to the total of both policies, "i1thereby accomplishing one of the primary goals of ERISA: that
plan participants or beneficiaries "not be deprived of compensation that
1
they reasonably anticipate under the plan's purported coverage." 18
Wayne Dillahey

113. For a discussion of the limited permissibility of escape clauses under
state common law, see supra notes 109-111 and accompanying text.
114. It is noted that the court desired this result and anticipated that plan
trustees who rewrote their plans would give their participants proper notice of
the revisions. See id. at 164 n. 17.
115. It is submitted that courts will reach this conclusion for reasons similar
to those stated by the Third Circuit in ILGWU in finding excess clauses and escape clauses incompatible. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's reasoning, see
supra notes 67-74 and accompanying text. It is submitted that conflicting excess
clauses provide no basis for determining which of the two plans should be liable
since each plan purports to make the other plan primarily liable. For a discussion of excess and escape clauses, see supra note 11.
116. 764 F.2d at 161 n.13. The court implied that it would reach this conclusion by noting that state courts faced with incompatible "other insurance"
clauses have followed this analysis. Id.
117. Id. Under state law, even if each insurer attempted to make his coverage excess, the courts would still protect the insured up to the total of all applicable policies. See C. APPLEMAN, supra note 11, § 4909 ("The courts, which
found the insured with two policies, will not leave him with none, but will require the insurers, in the ordinary instance, to prorate the loss.").
118. 764 F.2d at 163 (footnote omitted).
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